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Abstract 
In response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak and the role of air travel in facilitating the virus’s 
rapid spread around the world, this paper contributes to debates concerning the governance 
of infectious disease by examining the role of the Port Health Regulations and associated 
health security practices that are enacted at UK airports. While airports have been at the 
forefront of measures to prevent the importation of ‘foreign’ infectious diseases since the 
early 1930s, the present scale of international aeromobility combined with heightened 
awareness of the role air travel plays in the global spread of human pathogens, the 
epidemiological obsolescence of many early aeronautical sanitary regulations, and a dearth 
of academic studies on health security at airports, provide compelling reasons to examine 
the development, content, and implications of the existing Port Health Regulations and 
associated health security practices that are performed at UK airports.  
Drawing on extensive archival research and fieldwork interviews with key stakeholders in the 
aviation and health care sectors (including airport managers, ‘front line’ customer-facing 
airline personnel, and medical practitioners), we chart the development of sanitary 
regulations at UK airports and explore the current practices of health security that are 
performed at individual sites. We then identify the main challenges involved in safeguarding 
global public health against the dissemination of ‘foreign’ infectious diseases by air through 
UK airports and conclude by offering recommendations for improved practice. 
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Introduction 
Owing to its status as one of the most aerially interconnected nations on earth, it could be 
argued that the United Kingdom is particularly vulnerable to the risk of ‘foreign’ infectious 
diseases being imported by air through its airports. In line with international trends, 
passenger air travel to and from the UK has grown significantly in recent years, not only 
resulting in more UK residents being potentially exposed to ‘foreign’ infectious diseases for 
which they may no natural immunity but also increasing the risk of overseas visitors 
importing such ‘foreign’ diseases into the country (HPA, 2007, House of Lords, 2007). In 
2008, approximately 189 million international passengers used UK airports (CAA, 2008a, 
2008b) and, while the majority (125 million) travelled between the UK and countries of the 
European Union, significant numbers of people also travelled to and from destinations further 
afield. Figures from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) indicate that, in 2008, 5.4 million 
people flew to/from the Middle East, 5.1 million travelled between the UK and the Far East, 
and 3.6 million flew to/from destinations in North Africa (CAA, 2008b), regions in which all 
manner of infectious diseases may be endemic. Such high volumes of long-distance 
international aeromobility pose unique challenges to airports, airline operators, and decision-
makers and make the provision of effective health security practices at UK airports inherently 
challenging.  
Building on our previous examination of the historical ‘biogeopolitics’ of passenger aviation 
during the twentieth century (Budd et al, in press), this paper explores one aspect of global 
airline passenger health security that has received relatively scant academic attention to 
date - the health security practices that are performed at UK airports to safeguard public 
health. Given contemporary concerns relating to the H1N1 ‘swine’ influenza epidemic (which 
is believed to have arrived in the UK at Birmingham International Airport in the West 
Midlands on a charter flight from Mexico), our research is particularly timely. The paper 
begins by briefly describing the development of the Port Health Regulations in the UK and 
how they apply to airports. Drawing on extensive archival research and in-depth interviews 
with key stakeholders in the aviation and health care sectors (including airport managers, 
‘front line’ airline personnel and medical practitioners), we then outline the current practices 
and identify the main problems associated with safeguarding public health at UK airports and 
offer tentative recommendations as to how these challenges may be addressed.  
 
Aviation and the development of early international health security measures  
As the SARS epidemic of 2003 and, more recently, the 2009 H1N1 ‘swine flu’ epidemic, 
demonstrated, the movement of infectious diseases by air can have profound implications for 
human health and international mobility (Pang and Guindon, 2004; Bowen and Laroe, 2006; 
Ali and Keil, 2006). Indeed, numerous scholars (Royal and McCoubrey, 1989; Gerard, 2002; 
Mangili and Gendreau, 2005; Singer, 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Tatem et al., 2006; and 
Tatem and Hay, 2007) have attested to air travel’s important role in the global spread of 
infectious disease. However, while the potential for air passengers to incubate disease 
and/or carry vectors of infection between countries was first recognised in the early 1920s, it 
was not until the introduction of regular long-haul passenger services in the 1930s that any 
coordinated attempts were made to regulate the movements of air passengers and air cargo 
to safeguard (initially Western but later global) public health from the threat of ‘foreign’ 
infectious diseases being transmitted to different countries by air (see Budd et al, in press). 
These measures, which took the form of international agreements which prescribed for the 
routine disinsection of aircraft (the eradication of insects using chemical insecticides), the 
isolation or quarantine of individual travellers, and mandatory vaccination certificates, 
inevitably invoked political, as well as epidemiological, issues. As a result, individual nations 
often adopted very different prophylactic measures to try and counter the same biological 
threats (Baldwin, 1999). 
The first multilateral international public health agreement to deal expressly with air travel 
was devised in November 1924 at the Pan American Sanitary Conference. Here, 18 
countries in North, Central, and South America signed a code which called for the 
“prevention of the international spread of communicable infection of human beings” and, in 
the event such infections should occur, stipulated the cooperative measures that should be 
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implemented to prevent “the introduction and spread of disease” into hitherto unaffected 
territories by all means, including air travel (cited in García et al., 1999: 28). However, it was 
not until May 1929, when representatives of 38 countries attended a Congress on Sanitary 
Aviation in Paris, that the first truly international, as opposed to regional, assembly 
concerned with the public health implications of commercial aviation convened (Flight, 1930). 
Four years later, in April 1933, following extensive debate at the First International Sanitary 
Convention, an agreement that provided for the first international sanitary control of aerial 
navigation was prepared and ratified at The Hague (Massey, 1933).  
The resulting Convention, which became effective in August 1935, contained over 65 
separate Articles and dealt with threats posed by Typhus, Smallpox, Plague, Cholera, and 
Yellow Fever. The relative merits of providing specific facilities for the medical inspection of 
individual passengers at airports, as well as the control of certain ‘exotic’ tropical diseases 
around aerodromes, were debated. From an aviation perspective, the disease that caused 
the most concern was yellow fever and detailed suggestions on how to eradicate the vector 
of Yellow Fever, the Aëdes aegypti mosquito, were proposed (Mance, 1943). The 
Convention also established common international sanitary standards for commercial aircraft 
and landing grounds and provided, amongst other things, details for the construction of anti-
amaryl aerodromes, the control and/or isolation of air passengers originating in endemic 
yellow fever areas, preventative inoculation, and the destruction of insects in aircraft and 
around aerodromes (Whittingham, 1938). Many of these controls relied on quasi-scientific or 
medical interventions which were to be performed before passengers reached the airport, 
including quarantine, vaccination, and chemical prophalyxis. Other techniques for 
disinfection and disinsection were prescribed for airports and aircraft. However, as Budd et al 
(in press) demonstrate, enforcement of the regulations was logistically and politically 
problematic as those who were unaware of the rules, or deliberately chose to ignore them, 
undermined their effectiveness. 
The outbreak of the Second World War disrupted efforts to strengthen international 
measures for sanitary aviation. However, in 1944, the international community, through the 
auspices of the recently formed International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) and the World 
Health Assembly, attempted to standardise the control of infectious diseases that were 
known to be transmitted by air through a package of internationally binding measures. 
Chapter II Article 14 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, the document that 
provided for the post-war development of global civil aviation, stipulated that each 
contracting State must “take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air 
navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and other 
communicable diseases” (ICAO, 1944), while the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial 
Navigation (1944) called for ‘special measures to prevent the spread by air across frontiers 
of epidemic or other communicable diseases’ (United Nations, 1948: 250). Nevertheless, 
these directives were not implemented immediately and, in 1946, 13 separate international 
conventions relating to preventing the spread of international disease were still 
simultaneously in force (Cheng, 1962). 
 
The development of health security regulations in the UK 
While the provisions in the Chicago Convention undoubtedly advanced efforts to standardise 
aviation health security at the international level, individual states continued to actively 
devise their own protocols and debate how best to enshrine international directives into 
national law. At the time of the introduction of the First Sanitary Convention for aviation in the 
mid 1930s, the relatively small numbers of long-haul air travellers to/from the UK and the 
limited number of UK airports hosting international air services, meant that it was 
comparatively easy for UK-based airlines, airport personnel, immigration officials, and 
customs officers to comply with the health regulations. In 1948, four years after the Chicago 
Convention was signed, only eight UK airports (and one marine air terminal) supported 
scheduled international air services. However, by far the majority of these flights were short 
haul services to/from the near continent and the Irish Republic and only two airports, London 
and Prestwick (the latter simply by virtue of the fact that all transatlantic aircraft had to stop 
there to refuel), handled long haul intercontinental air traffic (see Table 1 overleaf).  
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Table 1: Foreign destinations served from London Airport in 1948 
 
Accra Calcutta Knocke/Le Zoute Prague 
Amsterdam  Colombo Madrid Rio de Janeiro 
Antwerp Delhi Montreal Santiago 
Bahrein [sic] Eindhoven Nairobi Sydney 
Bombay Frankfurt Nassau Tanganyika 
Brussels Havana New York Tehran 
Buenos Aires Istanbul Nice Vienna 
Cairo Johannesburg Paris Washington 
Source: derived from Thetford (1948) 
 
However, as the networks of long-haul passenger services grew throughout the latter half of 
the twentieth century, the need to introduce specific public health legislation for air travel 
became increasingly acute. At London Airport (now Heathrow), a dedicated Health Control 
Unit was established in 1947 (a year after the airport first opened to commercial air traffic) to 
deal with the public health risks posed by international air travel. Initially, this comprised a 
medical examination room and offices staffed by a dedicated team of health practitioners 
but, as medical technology developed, more advanced x-ray machines and other diagnostic 
equipment was progressively installed. However, by the early 1950s, rising numbers of 
international airline passengers, combined with a growing number of airports offering 
international services, made the intensive surveillance and policing of individual travellers, 
which had been a cornerstone of international civil aviation health policy in the 1920s and 
1930s, increasingly impractical. Moreover, a ‘moral panic’ which arose from an alleged link 
between rising levels of immigration to the UK, particularly from former British colonies in the 
Indian subcontinent, and rising rates of tuberculosis, resulted in the implementation of a Port 
of Arrival (or Port of Entry) system. Under this regime, particular groups of travellers, who 
were believed to represent a heightened disease risk by virtue of their nationality, were 
targeted for additional screening and examination on arrival in the UK. Significantly, a 
provision of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act empowered Port Health agents and 
immigration officials to refer certain categories of travellers for medical inspection before they 
were formally admitted to the UK. However, while this Act detailed the treatment and 
examination of potentially infected travellers, it did not explicitly state the precise nature of 
the health security measures that should (or could) be employed at airports or on aircraft 
(see Welshman and Bashford, 2006). 
In England, the first specific national powers for applying health controls on commercial 
aircraft and at UK airports were contained within the Public Health (Aircraft) Regulations Act 
1979 and the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984. In 2007, these regulations were 
revised and updated. The resulting Public Health (Aircraft) (Amendment) (England) 
Regulations 2007 forms one part of a package of legislative measures that are commonly 
termed the ‘Port Health Regulations’. Similar legislation exists, or is planned, for the 
devolved administrations. The Port Health Regulations define the measures that should be 
taken at airports against both arriving and departing passengers, crew, and aircraft to limit 
any potential risks to public health and reduce the spread of infection. These interventions 
include the medical examination of potential entrants to the UK, the grounding of aircraft and, 
if required, the detention of passengers, crew, cargo, and equipment until local health 
authorities are satisfied that no disease threat exists (HPA, 2006a). Under the 1971 
Immigration Act, immigration officers at UK ports and airports are also empowered to refer 
prospective entrants (who are subject to immigration control) for medical examination by a 
dedicated Port Medical Inspector (PMI). PMIs are appointed by the UK’s Health Protection 
Agency (an independent organisation established to protect public health in the UK), to 
defend the UK border from the importation of infectious disease.  While an Immigration 
Officer can, in principle, refuse a potential applicant entry to the UK on public health grounds 
in light of a PMI’s findings, there is little provision within the Port Health Regulations for 
actually applying health measures (other than offering certain vaccinations) to prospective 
entrants (HPA, 2006a).  
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The main statutory responsibility for implementing the Port Health Regulations at UK entry 
points, which include seaports, international railway stations, and airports, rests with the local 
authority in which the facility is sited. Some local authorities in areas of heightened 
transportation activity are specifically designated as Port Health Authorities (PHAs). These 
PHAs were created in the second half of the nineteenth century to perform Port Health 
functions at entry points to the UK with the aim of preventing the international dissemination 
of dangerous communicable diseases, initially by ships, but now also by international rail and 
air services (see Hawker et al, 2005). The task of providing or commissioning specialist staff 
to implement the Port Health Regulations at (air/sea)ports in the UK rests with the Local 
Authority, the local Primary Care Trust (a division of the NHS in England that provides some 
primary and community health services), or the Health Protection Agency. The majority of 
personnel employed by these institutions are either registered medical practitioners or 
certified environmental health officers. Out-of-hours cover is usually operated on a rota basis 
with General Practitioners (GPs) being contracted to perform medical checks in the event of 
an out-of-hours public health incident.  
As Budd et al (forthcoming) highlight, the recent introduction of regular international air 
services to and from UK regional airports has meant that some local authorities (simply by 
virtue of having an airport located within their administrative boundaries) have had to rapidly 
assume a Port Health function for which they often had no prior experience. Indeed, in the 
60-year period between 1948 and 2008, the number of UK airports handling international 
services increased from eight to 41, with the majority of these new services being 
inaugurated within the last five years (see DfT, 2005). This fundamental change in the spatial 
pattern of international air services from the UK was result of deliberate Government policy 
which sought to promote the growth of UK regional airports by liberalising the bilateral air 
service agreements that had previously regulated the routes that could be flown from each 
individual airport (DfT, 2003). As well as opening up new international markets for existing 
UK carriers, the UK Government also invited applications from foreign airlines who wished to 
operate new international services from regional airports (DfT, 2005). As a result, foreign 
airlines, including Emirates of the UAE, Pakistan International Airlines, and Continental 
Airlines of the United States, now operate regular long-haul international services to/from a 
number of regional UK airports (see CAA, 2007). As a direct result of assuming this relatively 
new role as sites that facilitate long distance international aeromobility, the provisions for 
safeguarding public health at these smaller regional airports may be less well defined than 
those at major London airports which have had more experience at dealing with the public 
health challenges associated with regular long-haul air travel (Budd et al, forthcoming). In the 
following section we discuss the health security procedures that are currently employed at 
UK airports and examine the public health challenges 21
st
 century patterns and practices of 
aeromobility pose.  
 
 
Enacting Port Health Regulations at UK airports  
Despite recent debates concerning the efficacy, effectiveness, and ethics of installing health 
screening technologies at UK airports to detect possible signs of infection in travellers, the 
majority of the existing UK Port Health surveillance strategy at airports remains covert and 
relies on the visual inspection of passengers by check-in agents or cabin crew, irrespective 
of origin or destination. However, owing to long-standing concerns relating to tuberculosis 
(TB) infection, travellers arriving in the UK from TB prevalent areas receive more targeted 
screening. Though the motivation for, and practices of, screening potential entrants for 
tuberculosis have been widely described and debated (Hardie and Watson, 1993; Ormerod, 
1998; Hogan et al, 2005;  Welshman and Bashford, 2006), the implications for airports that 
receive flights originating in TB prevalent areas have received far less attention. Given that 
all UK airports are obliged to provide a (often costly) Port Health response to flights arriving 
from TB prevalent overseas destinations, this situation warrants considered investigation. 
 
Owing to the procedural architecture of modern airports, there are only two funnelling points 
– immigration and customs – through which all arriving passengers pass. This obliges any 
point of entry health screening to be performed at one of these two locations. Currently, the 
responsibility for identifying potentially infected/infectious travellers rests with individual 
immigration officers, who must evaluate not only the originality and veracity of immigration 
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documents but also assess whether individual travellers pose a disease risk. The existing 
protocols mean that travellers not holding EU, North American, Australian, New Zealand or 
other ‘Western’ passports will be subject to more scrutiny (from both an immigration and an 
epidemiological perspective) than those that do. Under the current system, certain groups of 
travellers can be quickly identified and referred for additional immigration and/or health 
checks before being admitted to the UK.  
 
At the time of writing, UK Department of Health guidelines require UK airports to screen 
potential entrants from tuberculosis prevalent areas, who cannot provide evidence of BCG 
inoculation, using chest x-rays
1
. However, only two UK airports – London/Heathrow and 
London/Gatwick – have the facilities to undertake chest radiography on site and even then 
only in certain terminals. At all other UK airports, information on new entrants who may 
represent a TB risk is passed to the local Health Protection Agency office for follow up. 
However, this system is far from perfect as entrants may become ‘lost to the system’ or fail 
to attend follow-up appointments at local medical centres. Moreover, our research indicates 
that the existing Port Health procedures are inconsistent and the practices performed at one 
site may differ substantially from those at another (Budd et al, forthcoming).  
 
Interestingly, chest radiography represents the only medical screening technology that is 
routinely employed to safeguard public health at UK airports. The benefits of introducing 
other screening technologies, particularly thermal imaging cameras, have been debated in 
response to new and emerging disease threats and some commentators have called for 
technologies that are used at some overseas airports to be installed in the UK (see Warren 
et al, forthcoming). However, the potential introduction of any new screening technology 
invokes all manner of ethical, financial, technological, and practical concerns. Indeed, as we 
discuss in later sections of this paper, we have discovered evidence of considerable 
disagreement within individual stakeholder communities, with positions being polarised 
between those who feel that all possible measures should be taken to prevent the 
transmission of infectious disease and those who believe that some of the proposed new 
screening technologies go far beyond what is reasonable and infringe the privacy and dignity 
of individual travellers. In the remaining sections of this paper we consider in more detail 
some of the logistical challenges involved in safeguarding public health from the 
dissemination of ‘foreign’ infectious diseases through UK airports and conclude by offering 
recommendations for improved practice. 
 
 
Safeguarding public health at UK airports – problems and potential 
The empirical material presented in this section of the paper was obtained through extensive 
in-depth interviews that the research team conducted with key stakeholders in the aviation 
and health care sectors during 2009. Interviewees included airport managers and/or 
operations directors at four UK airports (including a major airport in the southeast), airline 
personnel (including cabin crew and flight dispatchers), and medical practitioners who had a 
Port Health responsibility. The latter group included both ‘front line’ clinical staff and senior 
managers and/or policy directors at regional health headquarters. All the interviews lasted a 
minimum of one hour and, as they were all conducted at the interviewee’s place of 
employment, many were accompanied with guided tours of the Port Health facilities. This 
enabled us to gain an appreciation of how the existing health security practices are enacted 
on a daily basis at different sites. At the request of our interviewees, no airports or individual 
staff members are identified. From the interviews and the action research, three key areas of 
concern for stakeholders emerged. The first relates to organisational complexity, which is 
perceived to obfuscate clear lines of command and responsibility. The second relates to 
inadequate communication between agencies involved in Port Health provision, while the 
                                                     
1
 In an attempt to mitigate some of the problems associated with Port of Entry screening of arrivals from endemic 
tuberculosis areas, the UK currently conducts pre-embarkation health screening in a number of overseas countries, 
including India and Pakistan, which have high population mobility to the UK and are able to perform the required 
medical screening to an acceptable standard. 
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third arises from both financial and practical constraints. Each of these areas is now 
addressed in turn. 
The liberalisation and privatisation of UK airports, combined with the outsourcing of UK 
health care providers, has meant that Port Health has become highly complex with 
numerous local, national, and international agencies and companies involved in its provision.  
Many of the practitioners to whom we spoke indicated that this complexity stemmed, at least 
in part, from the combined effects of: the 1974 reorganisation of the National Health Service 
and the subsequent creation (and recreation) of different agencies including Strategic Health 
Authorities, Primary Care Trusts, and the Health Protection Agency; the interaction between 
the Home Office, the Departments for Health and Transport, the UK Border Agency, the 
police, and HM Revenue and Customs; and the diverse pattern of airport and airline 
ownership in the UK. 
With respect to this last point, Humphreys and Francis (2002), among others, have attested 
to the diverse pattern of airport ownership in the UK. At the time of writing, seven UK airports 
are owned and operated by BAA (a company that is itself owned by a Spanish construction 
firm), four are owned and operated by Manchester Airports Group, while the remainder are 
owned and operated by a mixture of private enterprise and/or local authorities. As a result of 
this fragmentation of ownership, airports that are not part of a bigger airport group have little 
or no access to ‘best practice’ frameworks and cannot easily benchmark their own Port 
Health protocols or evaluate their performance with other similarly-sized facilities. Tellingly, 
several interviewees actually asked the research team how their own Port Health strategies 
and practices of intervention compared with those of other UK airports. All spoke of their 
desire to facilitate dialogue between neighbouring airports and of the need to improve the 
quality, clarity, and flow of documents between different agencies.  
The existence of some many different departments and agencies, each with its own 
priorities, acronyms and sets of internal working procedures, was identified as a particular 
problem by our interviewees. Many alleged that the scope of jurisdiction and/or the remit of 
responsibility of individual (often new or restructured) agencies was not always clear and 
hence staff were often unsure of which agency they should be working with at any point 
during an emerging Port Health incident. This uncertainty was made manifest by almost half 
of our interviewees (significantly all of whom were relatively ‘junior’ or front line customer-
facing staff) who used the terms ‘Strategic Health Authorities’, ‘Primary Care Trusts’, ‘Local 
Health Authorities’, and ‘Port Health Authorities’ interchangeably and often incorrectly during 
the course of their interview. However, all respondents, from junior to senior staff, also 
perceived there to be a lack of stability within individual organizations and several 
interviewees recounted incidents where valuable time was wasted trying to establish who 
they should be liasing with and verifying whether a particular individual had the authority to 
take decisions.                                                                     
The second major area of concern for our interviewees relates to communication. In addition 
to negotiating the bureaucracy associated with the complex organisational structure of 
contemporary Port Health provision, many front-line airport and airline staff claimed that 
existing communication channels were convoluted and ambiguous. While some departments 
and companies operating within particular airports appear to have clearly prescribed and well 
rehearsed checklists of Port Health procedures, this appears to be the exception rather than 
the norm and we were struck by the apparent lack of consistency both within and between 
different airports. While the Health Protection Agency has assumed the operational lead for 
ensuring that there is a single point of contact for Port Health and medical inspection 
services at all UK airports, our research indicates that further investment may be required to 
realise this goal. Finally, and in addition to the issues  discussed above, there are a number 
of financial and practical difficulties associated with safeguarding public health at UK airports 
that need to be highlighted.  
 
The third and final area of concern we discuss in this section of the paper arises from issues 
associated with financial cost and practicality. The progressive privatisation and 
commercialisation of UK airports that followed the 1986 Airports Act resulted in a new 
emphasis being placed on revenue generation from non-aviation related business 
(Humphreys, 1999). As a consequence, many airports have evolved into vast retail and 
entertainment spaces that have little, if anything, to do with flying. While the increased 
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commercialisation of airport space has enabled airport operators to extract maximum 
revenue from their assets, the implications for Port Health and health security provision have 
been largely overlooked. Indeed, though the provision of Port Health facilities is a statutory 
requirement for all UK airports supporting international services, Port Health does not 
represent a revenue stream for the airport operator and many health practitioners 
complained insufficient space was reserved for Port Health activities as a consequence. 
Moreover, we discovered that airport operators routinely charge rent on the space Port 
Health organisations occupy. Indeed, one interviewee, based in the southeast of England, 
reported that his organisation paid almost a quarter of its annual budget to the operator of 
the local airport in rent so as to secure continued space for a medical examination room. 
When challenged, he remarked that the existing requirements only state that Port Health 
facilities have to be present at international airports and, reflecting perhaps the age in which 
they were drafted, they do not say that airports have to provide rent-free space for these 
facilities.  
 
In addition to issues of cost, there are also practical problems that exacerbate the challenges 
of providing effective Port Health safeguards. As a direct consequence of recent terrorist 
attacks against commercial aircraft and airports, all available space in the security search 
area is devoted to anti-terrorist security measures meaning there is insufficient scope to 
provide Port Health with any space in which to conduct exit screening. Likewise, the 
immigration hall is designed to expedite the processing of potential entrants into the UK and 
very few airports have space in which entry screening technologies could be installed. 
Having said that, there may be scope for introducing some sort of mobile screening 
technology that could be moved to different boarding gates as required to screen 
passengers as they disembark from ‘high risk’ flights. 
 
 
Provisional recommendations  
 
Our interviews and action research – albeit from a small sample of UK airports - provide 
compelling evidence that stakeholders believe the efficacy of the existing Port Health system 
at UK airports is being compromised by financial and practical issues. Indeed, the complexity 
of the existing Port Health regulations, combined with the multifaceted pattern of airport 
ownership and health service provision in the UK, renders the challenge of delivering 
effective Port Health safeguards considerable. We gained a sense of frustration in which 
stakeholders, who want to ‘do the right thing’ by their employers and the travelling public, 
often feel that their actual impact is hindered by inefficient working practices and outdated 
public health priorities. For example, with respect to the latter point, medical practitioners 
expressed concern that the continued emphasis on the epidemiological risks associated with 
tuberculosis may mean the threats new and emerging infectious diseases pose to human 
health are not prioritised to the extent that they feel is required. While there is a clear need 
for further research in this area, we suggest that improving the clarity of the existing Port 
Health documentation to make the responsibility of different agencies explicit and fostering 
closer working links and dialogue between and among stakeholder groups, may help to 
alleviate some the difficulties that are currently associated with the existing regulations.  
 
We also suggest there would be considerable merit in assessing the health security 
practices that are performed at airports overseas and we foresee significant scope for future 
research that seeks to explore their application in a UK context. It is clear that many Port 
Health practitioners informally compare UK practices with those undertaken abroad. Two 
senior managers voluntarily made reference to the health declaration questionnaire that the 
United States administer to some airline passengers alongside conventional landing cards, 
while four other managers voluntarily assessed the relative merits of different screening 
technologies and quarantine practices. For certain medical practitioners, antigen mediated 
nasal swabs and, ultimately, molecular testing, are the preferred means of screening for 
influenza, but they recognise that these procedures would: be expensive and time 
consuming to produce and process; require trained staff to administer the swabs and 
analyse the results; and raise ethical concerns. In the short to medium term, therefore, we 
suggest that the introduction of a structured three-tier system of health screening may 
(depending on the nature of the disease threat) be appropriate for use in UK airports. At this 
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stage in our research, the information presented in Table 2 represents work in progress that 
is intentionally designed to generate public debate. 
 
 
Table 2: Proposed three-tier system of health screening for use in UK airports 
 
Level one – a questionnaire-based health declaration form (similar to a landing card). This 
would be distributed to all arriving airline passengers who require a landing card (i.e. non-EU 
passport holders). This questionnaire could include brief questions relating to the 
passenger’s recent travel history and their inoculation record. Potential health security risks 
could be identified and level two screening invoked if required. 
Level two – this phase would involve near-patient rapid testing that is quick, cheap, 
accurate, and non-invasive. Such processes may, for example, include the use of thermal 
imaging cameras. Passengers who show an elevated core body temperature (or another 
symptom of infection) may then be referred for level three screening. 
Level three – this final level would involve a physical examination by a doctor and/or x-ray 
and blood cultures. However, these methods are expensive, time consuming and invasive, 
raising numerous practical, legal, and ethical issues. We envisage that this level of screening 
would only ever be used in a minority of cases. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Recent outbreaks of highly infectious human diseases, including SARS and the H5N1 and 
H1N1 strains of influenza, have illustrated the continued epidemiological vulnerability 
associated with mass international air travel to and from the UK. Drawing on extensive 
archival research and fieldwork interviews with key stakeholders in the aviation and health 
care sectors, this paper charted the development of sanitary regulations at UK airports and 
explored the current practices of health security that are performed at individual sites. In 
many cases, we noted that the Port Health procedures and individual staff responsibilities 
are often poorly understood by airline and airport employees. In an effort to heighten 
awareness of the difficulties Port Health stakeholders face in trying to ensure health security 
at UK airports, we have highlighted three key areas of concern that require additional 
research to ensure their effective resolution. Finally, in order to generate debate, we have 
offered a number of tentative recommendations that may improve current practice. 
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